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Historians once assumed that the termination of the slave trade showed that Britons 
are—or at least can be—a genuinely sensitive people. That is, they didn’t understand 
eighteenth-century sensibility as a culture, a phenomenon, a cult. Things have 
changed, however, for outside of popular history little history is being done these 
days where sensibility is taken at face value. In this exploration of how historians are 
currently characterizing mid-to-late eighteenth-century abolitionists and their 
ostensibly sensitive audience, I suggest that historians now prefer to characterize 
them, not as bad, but as calculating and self-interested. But if the current preferred 
conception of the sensible “man of feeling” is as either a rational man or a man of 
artifice, there are murmurs arising from current research into pornography and 
abolitionist literature which suggest that he is in the process of becoming understood, 
rather, as perverse, lecherous—as a subject worthy neither of admiration nor of 
dispassionate assessment, but simply of scorn. 
Contemporary historians generally identify mid-to-late eighteenth-century “men 
[and women] of feeling”—those who would fashion and/or read and/ 
enthusiastically respond to philanthropic causes—as people who saw in (the fashion 
of) sensibility, means to improve their status in society. Though it is true that in his 
well-known “The Birth of Sensibility,” Paul Langford identifies sensibility as a 
cultural phenomenon which helped stabilize British society by working against deism 
and by improving the over-all wealth of the British nation, he presents sensibility 
primarily as a tool with which the middle class empowered itself vis-à-vis the upper 
class. According to Langford, in an era which prized money and property, gentility 
was the ultimate prize. And to be genteel in an age of sensibility you needn’t be 
aristocratic; indeed, since the court was seen as artificial, it could count against you. 
So long as you had wealth, property, and could demonstrate successfully both to 
yourself and to others that you truly sympathized with the suffering of others, you 
could be counted amongst the genteel. 
Langford’s conception of sensibility as the means by which self-righteousness 
and social position was rooted fits very well with the conception of the sensitive 
offered by other prominent contemporary historians of British society such as Anne 
Mellor, Linda Colley, and Barker-Benfield. These historians often characterize 
sensibility as a tool used intentionally for purposes of self-empowerment and 
satisfaction. Those who saw themselves as sensible were not, then, as they preferred 
to imagine themselves as, as free of artifice— “natural;” indeed, Langford explicitly 
states that “naturalism was a cover for ever more contrived artifice” (477). Sentiment, 
he argues, was fundamentally about the individual and his/her own feelings (481). It 
was something fundamentally about one’s own needs, not those of others. He argues 
that such a conception of sentiment was recognized (by whom, Langford does not 
explain) as “dangerous” (481), but was “rendered useful” (481) by making it 
ostensibly about others, about attending and giving to others in need (the 
transformation of “sentiment” to “sensibility”). Sentiment needed to be directed, but 
could ostensibly have been directed near anywhere and serve its primary purpose of 
self-empowerment and self-validation on the part of the sensible. 
Brycchan Carey’s “Read this and Blush” argues that abolitionists and slavery 
apologists at the time actually saw sensibility as a movement which needn’t 
necessarily have been directed towards ending the slave trade. But before exploring 
Carey’s article and how it too presents us with a conception of the sensible which is 
typical but (perhaps) in the process of becoming highly contestable, I will note that 
though Langford’s article attempts a general overview of the culture of sensibility, 
though it offers no examination of primary material, it still advances a conception of 
men and women of feeling that can in my judgment convince simply because it offers 
one contemporary historians are eager to accept. Though the current trend in 
historiography is strongly against seeing historical subjects as beneficent, it does not 
lean towards imagining them as evil or amoral. Instead, the expectation is that in any 
cultural era one will find people who are more or less the same as in any other. 
Cultures vary drastically, but (ostensibly) not so a people’s essential nature (Barker-
Benfield, referring to Norbert Elias psychoanalytic study of cultural development, 
actually argues that people do change—but not that they improve). Langford’s 
subjects are far more self-interested than they are selfless, but they are not bad 
people: he thus offers the preferred (by historians) conception of people as neither 
heroic nor horrific. Though he writes that “abolition takes its place among the 
manifold expressions of the new sensibility” (516), and thereby makes abolition seem 
simply one of many means by which the fashionable engaged in the latest fashion—
“sensibility,” he also writes that true “sensitivity to the plight” (505) of others arose 
from increased awareness of their suffering. Sensibility is to Langford (as it is to most 
historians of English culture) integral to the humanitarian movement, but not only or 
primarily such. 
Like Langford, Carey is another historian who offers a sense of the eighteenth-
century sensible “man” as someone of considerable artifice. He is as well another 
historian concerned to show how sensibility was used by one group against another; 
indeed, his article is primarily about how various prominent abolitionist and slavery 
apologists used sentimental rhetoric in a heated battle for the hearts of the British 
public. Readers of abolitionist literature are made to seem as if their level of interest 
in the slave trade depended upon the ability of abolitionists to craft writings that 
provided the satisfactions they were looking for. And these were? As the eighteenth-
century progressed, readers increasingly expected sentimental descriptions of slaves 
so that they could make use of them to evidence their ostensibly intrinsic capacity to 
pity. As with Langford’s, in Carey’s account of them sentimental readers come across 
as a fickle lot—they had to handled in just the right way. He writes that abolitionists 
such as James Ramsey needed to know just how to use guilt to make readers feel 
obliged to support abolitionist efforts, without insulting them. They come across as 
completely self-interested, and as rather insincere as well: in a part of the article where 
he informs us how sentimental rhetoric was employed by both abolitionists and by 
slavery apologists, we are told that both abolitionists and slavery apologists felt the 
sensible public could be distracted away from the goings-on in the slave trade.  (We 
are told of how James Tobin and the Bristol newspapers used sentimental rhetoric in 
an effort to draw the sensitive reader to feel for the suffering agriculturalist and 
chimney sweep.) 
Apparent in this article is not just how much the reading public demanded of 
writers of abolitionist literature, but also how able these writers proved in meeting 
their demands. About James Ramsay’s Essay on the Treatment and Conversion of African 
Slaves in the British Sugar Colonies, Carey writes: 
 
Ramsay’s style is neither overtly evangelical, nor overtly sentimental. Rather, 
he sets out to discuss slavery under various headings and in various styles, 
which initially gives the Essay a somewhat eclectic appearance. He writes about 
the history of slavery in the style of an historian, about the economics of 
slavery in the style of the new political economists, about the theology of 
slavery in the style of an Anglican clergyman, and about the humanity of 
slavery in the style of a sentimental novelist. Long before he chooses to deploy 
his sentimental rhetoric, Ramsay shows that he intends to be rigorous and 
scholarly. His descriptions of the daily routine of plantation slaves are 
meticulous on the one hand, while on the other hand he shows that he is 
prepared to take on some of the most celebrated thinkers of his age. (110) 
 
Ramsay comes across here as a master of rhetoric, whose range and finesse with 
rhetorical tropes/tricks is on par with an adept playwright’s. But Carey seems most 
concerned to characterize them not so much as artisans but as commanders, 
commanders who used rhetoric not simply to satisfy readers’ desires and actions but 
to determine them. Thomas Clarkson (whose “Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the 
Human Species [. . .] replaced James Ramsay’s Essay as the handbook of the emerging 
abolition movement” [130]), though he had never been to Africa, still with his 
writings determined the nature of how Africa and the slave experience came to be 
understood in Britain through the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the 
nineteenth century (133). And he was fully aware of his power: we are told he 
“recognized the power of his vision to mould other people’s perceptions” (133). 
When Carey attends to the sentimental efforts of slavery apologists, they too are 
described as empowered and cunning.  Slavery apologists such as James Tobin come 
across, then, exactly as we would have expected them to have, given how they were 
introduced in the introduction (to the book of which this article constitutes one 
chapter) as “as skilful as they are insidious” (17). They—a select group—are insidious, 
evil; but like their rhetoric-wielding counterparts, they are not driven by sordid 
passions they remain largely unconscious of: they too are men of reason. Both groups 
of writers might, however, have come across as something other than as expert 
tacticians had Carey offered us lengthier selections of their descriptions of slave’ or 
chimney sweep’ life, and had he not directed us to look at the selections he does in 
fact supply as evidence of their rhetorical mastery. Though he does tell us that in 
Ramsay’s Essay we can find “forty pages of minute detail of the slaves’ daily 
sufferings” (11), and that in Clarkson’s Essay “there are many terrible, painful images 
of slaves suffering, and [that] we are repeatedly asked to sympathize not with the 
dismal and melancholy images beloved of sentimentalists but with more horrific 
images of violence and abuse” (132), very likely at the end of reading his article we do 
not suspect their interest in suffering arose from their being perverse. 
In “Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture,” 
Karen Halttunen actually asks if writers of abolitionist literature (her focus is on 
British and American culture from the late eighteenth to the mid nineteenth-century) 
enjoyed writing about/depicting slaves’ suffering. She writes: “Was it possible [. . .] 
that the reformers’ own sensibilities had been blunted or, worse, that their 
spectatorship had generated in them a positive taste for cruelty?” (326). But 
Halttunen is not putting forward her own question here; rather, it is one reformers 
were themselves asking concerning the potential effects of their long-witnessing of 
pain and suffering. She argues that in the eighteenth-century the “cult of sensibility” 
(304) redefined pain so that it became something which was not just unacceptable, 
something which shouldn’t simply be tolerated as part of man’s lot, but something 
which could warp the minds and souls of those exposed to too much of it. It became 
generally understood that spectatorial sympathy could lead, not just to blunting one’s 
sensibilities but to the development of a taste for pain (308), a taste which manifested 
itself in the burgeoning popularity of gothic fiction. She writes that humanitarian 
reformers were concerned to prove that their own witnessing of horrific abuse hadn’t 
corrupted them. Anti-slavery writers, who often relied on extensive descriptions of 
torture they themselves had witnessed to help determine the nature of public regard 
for the slave trade, therefore “filled their writings with close descriptions of their own 
immediate emotional response to the spectacle of suffering, to demonstrate that their 
sensibilities remained undamaged” (326). Reformers (anti-slave trade and otherwise) 
were also concerned that the printed word could cultivate a taste for pain. They used 
a variety of techniques to help “distance themselves from any imputations of 
sensationalistic pandering” (328). (For example, she notes that Newton and Clarkson 
both use asterisks [328].) But, she writes, “[m]ost commonly, reformers’ apologies, 
demurrals, and denials of sensationalism were simply followed by shockingly vivid 
representations of human suffering” (330). 
If they knew or suspected that such vivid representations risked warping their 
audience, risked actually producing more cruelty, why then did they for the most part 
still persist in showing them to their audience? Two possible answers come to mind. 
One, they did so because they decided that though they surely risked harming their 
readers, many of the afflicted would as a result find themselves even more 
determined to do something to help end the suffering. Two, they did so because they 
were sadists—whether or not as a result of prolonged exposure to others’ pain, 
something had warped them so that they were now compelled to draw others into 
their sickly state. Halttunen considers both possibilities, but very clearly prefers the 
former. She tells us that “[t]he reformers’ purpose was not to exploit the obscenity of 
pain but to expose it, in order to redefine a wide range of previously accepted social 
practices as cruel and unacceptable” (330). However, she appreciates that by 
persisting to show the scenes they could be understood as being moved primarily by 
the latter impulse. But she works to persuade and even intimidate us away from 
understanding reformers as mostly sadistic, for she writes, “the historical emergence 
of the pornography of pain in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and 
its wide-ranging presence in a variety of popular literary genres point the historical 
inadequacy of attributing the phenomenon solely to sexual psychopathology, whether 
individual or collective” (331). 
Marcus Wood, in “Stedman: Slavery, Empathy, Pornography,” more or less 
comes to the opposite conclusion: that is, he argues that writers and readers of 
pornographic depictions of slaves were moved primarily by sadistic and/or 
masochistic impulses—they were perverse. As a test case to see if the eroticization of 
slave imagery was necessarily pornographic, he explores John Stedman’s writings on 
the slave trade. He concludes that though Stedman’s work before the 1790s was often 
salutary, in the ’90s it is clear that Stedman produced work from which he clearly 
took pleasure in his eroticized depictions of slave life. Wood believes that Stedman 
satisfied two urges in particular when he wrote his scenes of slave torture. One, he 
satisfied his masochistic need to vicariously experience the victim’s pain. Two, he 
took masturbatory and sadistic pleasure in “witnessing” male and female slaves 
subjected (essentially) to sexual violation. 
Wood would have us believe that the ostensibly sensible, those who wrote and 
read anti-slavery tracts, exploited the suffering of slaves in a way and to an extent 
advanced by no other historian so far considered. He really does make the sensible 
out to be abhorrent and evil—people whose pleasure in witnessing abuse was such 
that it is hard to believe they could have been anything but disappointed when victory 
was achieved and the slave trade finally ended. But it isn’t just the eighteenth-century 
sensibles who stand so accused. That is, there is a strong sense that twentieth-century 
historians—his contemporaries, his own cohort—are being charged with being 
perverse as well. Historians approach what he believes is really quite obviously simply 
pornographic literature, always out of higher purpose—just like sensibles did—and 
neither, suspiciously, and ultimately indictedly, can see the pornography: Wood would 
have us know that actually they’re both excusing their satisfaction of illicit desires at 
their subjects’ expense. 
Wood makes other historians seem worthy of censure, and some historians are 
responding to him in kind. Carey, for example, writes that “Wood may not convince 
all readers that abolitionists were principally motivated by a desire to view sado-
masochistic pornography (although, no doubt, some were), but he does remind us 
very strongly that the discourse of slavery and abolition is thoroughly entwined with 
other early-modern and modern discourses about the body, the mind, the soul, 
society, economy, and the fundamental questions asked by every generation about 
human nature and humanity’s place in the universe” (13). In this reference to Wood’s 
writing, I, at least, sense Carey both admonishing and schooling Wood. Wood is 
being reminded that historians know that though there are always individual 
exceptions; no group of people is entirely either benevolent or sick—they’re always 
(ostensibly) a mixture of the good and the bad. People are essentially the same, 
wherever placed in time: their motives are common sense, never psychiatrist-worthy. 
Any other opinion is self-evidently ignorant. He is also being reminded that it is 
preferred that you mostly not talk motives, anyhow, especially their masturbatory, 
oral, sadistic, bodily ones. Instead, you are to talk about cultural discourses about the body 
subjects were located within and participated in. That is, you are to delimit the 
conversation about human motivation to conversations about conversations. 
I happen to like Wood’s willingness to write of historical subjects as having 
masturbatory and oral needs. I admire how involved Wood is willing to become in 
the lives of those he studies, of the risk he is willing to take in hopes of figuring out 
what makes them tick. There is a real sense that when he estimates that Stedman “is 
like some gargantuan method actor always trying to get inside the experience of the 
victim, [. . .] always trying to eat up their suffering, so that in the end he can play their 
part better than they did” (139-40), that he came to this conclusion by trying to get 
inside Stedman’s experiential world.  That is, in his efforts to understand Stedman, he 
becomes something of the method actor himself. This sort of immersion is risky; 
identifying with someone like Stedman may be unsettling, and rarely do I see such 
boldness from historians. It can also lead to ridicule. For example, in the ’70s the 
psychohistorian Lloyd DeMause wrote that he would curl up in a fetal position to 
help access the mental/emotional states of historical subjects he believed were 
regressing to states associated with birth, but such admissions helped make both him 
and psychohistory aptly sumuppable as “clownish” once academia had finally cleared 
itself from the unsettling 1960s/70s influences that had them for a short while letting 
their guard down, and allowing some outside “crazy thinking” in. 
Wood’s essay actually very much reminds me of the sort of research one can still 
find in journals (if even still, ever so rarely) such as The Journal of Psychohistory. As with 
Wood’s essays, articles for this journal are willing to and do assume that historical 
subjects were often far more emotive, passionate, and sexual than they were rational 
and calculating. Unlike Wood’s article, however, what they don’t do is moralize; and it 
is his strong tendency to moralize, to condemn, that I find puzzling, unfortunate, and 
am myself inclined to want to censure. Wood understands Stedman and other 
reformers as sadists and/or masochists. He can identify Stedman as “a person of 
strong direct emotional responses and apparently without remorse” (138). But he 
does not seem to want us to involve ourselves in understanding how he came to be 
this way. No, Stedman is not set up to be understood, only for censure and ridicule. 
For example, when he discusses Stedman’s fear that he could be the subject of female 
rape, he directs us to “see the hysterical and intensely misogynistic account in 
Stedman, 1962, 39-40” (125). One senses here that if we looked at the account he 
directs us to and did not immediately recognize Stedman as but a vile woman-hater, 
he would judge us suspect ourselves. Be assured, a therapist would find Wood’s 
characterization of Stedman as working against an empathic appreciation of why he 
feared older women; indeed, s/he would conclude it worked against understanding 
him, and judge it, as I judge it—cruel. 
The current historiographical exploration of sensitivity and the English slave 
trade suggests that true sensitivity and empathy is a very hard thing to cultivate. But 
though I gauge Wood’s desire to humiliate Stedman, to show him up, extremely 
unfortunate, I find his efforts far more emancipatory and encouraging than 
depressing. With his work, with the alarmed reaction his work inspires from other 
historians, I sense the conception of historical subjects as mostly reasoning (or 
calculating) as coming under effective attack, and believe it could work to build 
stronger bridges between history and psychology/therapy. My hope is that it could 
help move some of those currently entering the historical field to engage more 
seriously with explorations of historical motives, once so fruitfully entertained in the 
’70s. And if some of them do look anew at the research being engaged with at that 
time, they might find themselves empowered so they could actually accept Wood’s 
assessment of reformers, recognize them as often disingenuous, and yet still 
understand them as genuinely improving—as members of a generation that really were 
more empathic and sensitive than their predecessors were. That is, they might come 
to appreciate that the old whig historians, though mostly about triumphalism, actually 
held constant to an admirable historical truth.  
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